A few months ago, Fannie Mae introduced Property Inspection Waivers or PIWs. Recently, Fannie Mae rebranded them as Appraisal Waivers (AW?). (see www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/property-inspection-waiver).
These ‘waivers’ provide an option to forgo a traditional appraisal when getting a mortgage for certain refinance and purchase transactions in the guise of saving the consumer time and money associated with obtaining a mortgage.
Consumer (and agent), be warned, the bank or lender may use an AVM or other valuation tool to value the asset to be mortgaged. There will be no traditional appraisal. Without a traditional appraisal, prepared by a local area expert, you may not know what the
true market value of the asset is, be it an SFR, townhome, condo or small apartment building, and you could be paying more than what it is actually worth. Another aspect of this scenario to consider is that when the consumer agrees to the PIW or AW he/she
will be signing away the rights to any future litigation against Fannie Mae or the lender because they will be absolved from “future enforcement of representations and warranties on the value, condition, and marketability of the property” according to Fannie
Mae’s Day 1 Certainty. This does not protect the consumer or their agents rather it protects the lender.
The appraisal waiver will satisfy the lenders requirement criteria and may be supplemented with a valuation model of their selection but this will not provide the consumer (purchaser) with the peace of mind of knowing that the property purchased is worth the
price paid or financed. I strongly recommend that if the bank does not require an appraisal that the consumer obtain their own appraisal so that they understand the true market value of the asset and that their best interests are protected. I also strongly
recommend that the real estate agent specify a contingency based on a private appraisal to be performed. This will protect the consumer’s interest and the agent's position in the transaction and protect them from the confines of Fannie Mae’s Day 1 Certainty.
The introduction of new valuation and loan methods employed by lenders and Fannie Mae presents the need for the consumer to ensure that their best interests are considered.
Abraham Lincoln once said, "Be sure to put your feet in the right place before trying to stand firm." That belief more than ever applies to the real estate appraisal world, given the pending agreement between the
New York Attorney General and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Many trees have been felled creating the paper necessary for trade associations, governmental agencies, Congress, the general public, and countless others
to provide comments and input into the final version of the Home Valuation Code of Conduct and related Independent Valuation Protection Institute
As an outgrowth of the savings and loan crisis in the late '80s, state and federal legislation (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 [FIRREA]) was crafted to instill a better loan
process, including appraisals. State licensing, the formation of strong appraisal review departments inside major lenders, and clearer lines of proper communication between parties involved in a loan transaction were specified. Unfortunately, most of these
initial steps have proven to lack vigor.
Observing the substantive financial crisis currently underway, prior action hardly can be said to be doing the job. Many states already have enacted legislation prohibiting instruction to the appraiser of a desired
value outcome, and Congress has several measures in committee that speak directly to appraisals.
The Proposed Code of Conduct
The code of conduct attempts to alter processes and implied conflicts of interest, and provide oversight in a way to correct prior shortcomings. Without a doubt, two fundamental objectives are reinforced heavily
throughout the code. The signers recognized that it is essential in effective risk management to have accurate and unbiased valuations. To that end, appraiser independence is reinforced in several ways. Second, the proposed code speaks to appraisal information
being important to consumers when they consider their best financial interests. A more transparent process bringing about greater consumer confidence in the lending system is clearly a desired outcome of the code. Obviously, the proposed changes are intended
to merge properly with other active consumer protection measures, such as the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). No doubt, further legislative actions can be expected, so things can get a bit complicated to say the least.
Appraisal independence is clearly the intention behind issues of who can order an appraisal-mortgage bankers, loan production staff, and commissioned personnel cannot, and lenders cannot use in-house staff except
for appraisal review.
Further, no predetermined value expectation can be provided, nor can payment be withheld. And, as we would all expect, wording such as coercion, threats, collusion, inducement, intimidation, and bribery are prominent.
It becomes the lender's responsibility to provide the consumer a copy of all appraisals obtained on a property no less than three days prior to closing. The lender will not be allowed to own an affiliate, an entity
owned by more than a 20 percent share, or a real estate settlement service provider that supplies real estate valuations for said lender. In fact, real estate settlement service providers will not be allowed to provide appraisals at all where traditional
"bundled services" are combined title, appraisal, credit, and flood. The clarity of free-standing valuation work being provided is strongly underscored. Transparency and consumer confidence are emphasized.
Many other direct instructions are contained in the code that will assist in the effort of building consumer confidence. Lenders are instructed to create hotlines for complaints from appraisers, individuals, or
entities that have concerns about improper influencing.
The Independent Valuation Protection Institute
Quality testing of 10 percent of all appraisals will be sent to the IVPI. And, most important, the lender will have to certify that its processes comply with the code in order for mortgages to be qualified for purchase
by the GSEs.
The intention of the IVPI is to monitor the process surrounding "truly sound, accurate, independent, and reliable appraisals." They, too, will have a hotline dedicated to potential appraiser independence issues.
The IVPI will mediate complaints with possible forwarding of the complaint to the relevant enforcement agency, whether state or federal. Experts in the fields of finance, law enforcement, compliance review, and other independent individuals are expected
to be on the board of directors of the IVPI.
An Eye on the Future
It is a lot to digest, and I fully expect other significant market players to subscribe to at least the intent of the code. One reasonably can expect that FHA, Wall Street, and other loan securitization providers
will fall into full stride with the code of conduct. In fact, many of these entities have begun to implement elements of the code believing such efforts will better ensure loan quality. Therefore, even if portions of the agreement are altered, my bet is the
appraisal world is about to be changed significantly.
One can only speculate as to the specifics of those possible changes until the participants finalize the code. It is stressful for sure, but we should be reminded tl1at times of stress often create the best of futures. Fifteenth -century Italy was dominated
by class warfare, slaughter, and trampling of human rights; however, it was followed by the great revitalization that gave us Leonardo, Michelangelo, and the Renaissance. I hope that the proposed Home Valuation Code of Conduct will lead to a similar outcome.
In September 2007, Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, was quoted as saying “we’ve had a bubble in housing” and, in the wake of the sub-prime mortgage and credit crisis, “I really didn’t
get it until very late in 2005 and 2006.”
It is interesting that Greenspan did not “get it” because he essentially started it. He lowered rates, kept them down during President Clinton’s administration, and continued to do so during the second Bush administration and that practice is a major reason
for the current problems in the real estate market.
Greenspan was able to get away with the rate reductions because government indicators showed that inflation was under control. However, these indicators are skewed because the government measures only core inflation, which does not count food and energy cost
increases, causing economists to say that “Core inflation makes sense only for people who don’t eat or drive” (Cooper 2007). It also ignores selected items for other reasons; for example, the increase in the cost of cars is not counted because it is claimed
that cars are always improving Nevertheless, beginning in the 1990s there was a reason many manufactured items did not increase in cost: the influx of goods made in China. With the cheapest labor costs in the world, China began exporting items at prices well
below those for anything manufactured in the United States. This forced many companies to either go out of business or make their products overseas. As a result, prices for many items went down, even if the cost of other items increased. The average, however,
made it appear that inflation was relatively low.
All these factors gave the government an excuse to keep rates down for a prolonged period of time and eventually housing prices started to escalate. Typically, when Americans want to buy a house, they look at the monthly
payment that fits their income, not the price of the property. Therefore, if interest rates are lowered, prices are bound to increase.
Certainly, the argument could be made, as many have, that the Fed was acting irresponsibly. In the October 1, 2007 issue of
BusinessWeek, Vitaliy Katsenelson, author and portfolio manager, speaking of the latest rate cut by the Fed said, “The 2001 rate cuts caused the bubble that is now a crisis. Indeed, at the core of today’s credit mess—whether in housing or the now battered
markets for commercial paper—lies a glut of global liquidity. That has dramatically altered our perception of risk and fueled an unwillingness to accept traditional credit limits.”
This leads to the second factor causing these problems. Besides the fact that money became “cheap” when the Fed lowered rates, it also became more available because lending practices loosened. Irresponsible changes occurred, such as the Fed’s
reserve requirements for banks, which were loosened in the late 1980s, allowing banks to keep a lower percentage of deposits and therefore lend a higher percentage of their funds.
As rates declined, mortgage lenders also loosened their requirements and invented new types of loans based on the fallacious supposition that people would be able to pay more in the future, since real estate and wages would continue
to increase indefinitely. Many of these loans were given to people with good credit who wanted to buy more expensive homes than they could otherwise afford. With an adjustable rate mortgage starting at three percent, for example, the monthly payment on a $400,000
mortgage is only $1,686 per month, $712.00 less than the $2,398 required at a six percent rate. As Katsenelson goes on to say in the
BusinessWeek article, “If a home owner couldn’t qualify for a conventional mortgage, brokers were more than happy to offer an exotic loan the borrower could never realistically pay off. If a loan was too risky to be sold as investment-grade, investment
banks could always concoct elaborate bundles of good and toxic credits that (supposedly) eliminated risk.”
At the same time, the advent of sub-prime lending was perhaps the most serious development to lead to the present quagmire. One of the biggest players in that market was a company called Ameriquest, which targeted people with bad credit and made loans to them
for exorbitant rates. In 2006, Ameriquest paid a record $325 million to settle a class-action lawsuit over allegations of predatory lending practices, such as bait and switch and usury. However, while Ameriquest was in its heyday, making millions of dollars
with sub prime loans, other lenders noticed and joined in. New companies were created only for this business and many of them are now defunct. General Electric got into the business with WMC Mortgage and “A” paper lenders such as Countrywide, the largest mortgage
lender in the United States, joined in with its Full Spectrum branch.
Moreover, lenders like Washington Mutual, although they did not make sub-prime loans, were buying packages of sub-prime loans from lenders like Ameriquest. If the Fed had been irresponsible, the lenders compounded it by their shortsighted practices. They
also forgot a basic rule in lending: that people with bad credit who do not pay their bills generally do not change. Moreover, adding to this mess is the fact that the loan broker rarely has a stake in what happens to the loan after it is made, since it is
generally sold off to another entity.
After the real estate meltdown in the 1980s, the government decided that appraisers should be licensed. Licensing was supposed to protect the public from fraudulent loans because appraisers
would be sufficiently educated in the profession. That would have been a grand solution if education was really the issue before licensing was required. However, the real problem was, and continues to be, the fact that lenders can hire their own appraisers.
This practice immediately puts the appraiser in the position of having to please the lender to stay in business. This is akin to the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse but the banking establishment has ignored it.
In fact, in the 1980s HUD/FHA appraisers were assigned to cases just as VA appraisers are today. It was a random assignment system that precluded any involvement of the appraiser with the lender
to procure the work. However, that practice stopped after the banking industry lobbied Congress to allow lenders to choose their own appraisers for FHA loans.
Including owner concessions in the purchase money agreement is another factor that has inflated values. Once a rarity, it has become a common practice—probably because of the malleability of appraisers—for everyone
to assume that the value will come in regardless of the padding of “thin air” to the sale price. For example, a buyer wants to make an offer that is $7,000 lower than the property’s listed price of $280,000. Instead of offering $273,000, the buyer offers the
full price with concessions of $7,000. The concessions might be attributable to closing costs or to a rebate, but the effect is that the lender is financing a larger percentage of the market value of the property.
Concessions have a twofold effect on the market. First, as they have become common, they inflate values approximately two to three percent, depending on the amount. Second, when appraisers or buyers and sellers look at sales,
many of the sale prices do not reflect the actual money paid for the house. Moreover, appraisers rarely know if there are concessions associated with the sale comparables they are using because they are not noted in most multiple listing services, and calling
each party to the loan is too time consuming, and often agents are unwilling to cooperate.
Another reason for the decline in the current market situation in most areas is the fact that the majority of real estate investors has left the marketplace and instead is attempting to sell their properties. Many of those who
invested in real estate in the past several years were previously in the stock market or had never invested before but wanted to “get in the game” because they saw large increases. Some first-time investors used equity lines on their homes to make the down
payments for their purchases. These “amateurs” often paid more for homes than well informed real estate investors normally do, driving prices sky high. It is estimated that the amount of real estate purchases for single-family residences bought by investors
is between 10 and 25 percent, depending on the region of the country. With these people no longer buying and with some selling, inventory is increasing and prices are decreasing.
In the multifamily residence market, capitalization rates have descended over the past several years. This drop is related to lower interest rates and optimistic over speculation. The lower the capitalization rate, the higher the value. And in
many areas of the country capitalization rates decreased substantially as interest on FDIC insured certificates of deposit (CDs) decreased because of the decrease in the Fed’s prime rate, which also decreased mortgage costs.